WHAT SHOULD A JEW DO?
Sidney Gendin
Eastern Michigan University

rthodox" is one of
those words like
"official" or "authority"
meant to give weight to
an otherwise lightweight concept. I heard an
"authority" on the Civil War state that the
"official" name for that war is "The War
Between the States." I learned that he meant
nothing more than that it was popularly socalled by many historians.The "authority"
looked with righteous contempt upon
"laymen" who didn't know any better.
We have a situation not unlike the above
in the world of Judaic titles. In the 1800s a
group of rabbis hit upon the very unfortunate
idea of calling their new movement "Reform
Judaism." A responding group of rabbis then
adopted the title "Orthodox." Ever since, it
has been an uphill battle for the "Reform"
Jews. "Reform" Jews eagerly desire respect and
recognition from their rivals. This respect and
recognition has never occurred and never
will. The typical "Orthodox" Jew regards the
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"Reform" Jew with contempt, as a particularly vile heretic not quite so fit to associate
with as an admitted atheist. Even "humanistic" Jews, those proud of their heritage but
who do not practice the religion, suppose
that "real" Jews are "Orthodox" and that
there is something of the sham about
"Reformism." (I speak knowledgeably as one
raised in a blended community of the
"Onhodox" and the "humanistic," the son of
immigrant parents who spoke Yiddish almost
exclusively; I knew no non-Jews, apart from
my teachers, until I finished college and
. entered graduate school.) Had those 19th
century rabbis been shrewd enough to call
their movement "Biblical Judaism," who can
say for sure where the balance of prestige
would lie today?
. In the light of this background it is instructive to compare the reception Riehard
Schwartz's book, Judaism and Vegetarianism, is
bound to receive within the Jewish community as a whole with the reception that will
be accorded David Bleich's article, "Judaism
and Animal Experimentation." Schwartz
argues the case for vegetarianism for Jews.
Bleich, despite the title of his article, defends
a wide range of traditional exploitations of
animals; experimentation gets almost
insignificant coverage. Schwartz has a Ph.D.
in civil engineering and is now a mathematics professor. He speaks to us from the
"Reform" perspective. Bleich is a rabbi, a professor of Talmudic Studies at Yeshiva University, a former Visiting Scholar at the Oxford
Center for post-graduate Hebrew Studies, and
a member of the Board of Directors of the
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations in
America. In short, it is inevitable that
Schwartz will have zero impact on the
"Orthodox" and "Conservative" communities. ("Conservatism" is rather like a halfway
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house between "Orthodox" and "Reform.")
On the other hand, Bleich will surely reinforce the views and practices of those communities, and it is likely he will exert
influence on "Reform" and "humanistic" Jews
alike. "Reform" Jews battle a sense of inferiority, a feeling they are not quite at the center
of things, and are themselves inclined to
thi~k,grudgingly, that it is the "Orthodox"
rabbi who is the "true" scholar. As for the
"humanistic" Jew, s/he knows there are.
"Reform" rabbis who do not understand
Hebrew and read only as much liturgical
Hebrew as is necessary to conduct services.
S/he may not change his/her practices after
reading BleIch but s/he may well go away
feeling that something s/he is doing is not
st~ictly kosher.
To provide background for my discussion of
Bleich and Schwartz, I want first to take a
peek at some history of Jewish thought.
The Jewish Bible did not receive its final
rabbinical ratification until sometime about
90 C.E., and that canonization includes only
such books of the Old Testament as were produced prior to 250 B.C.E. Among those
books, some are holier than others. In particular, the holiest are the first five books, called
the Pentateuch by Christians and the Torah
. by Jews. In them one finds the details of
Jewish law. The Torah is thought to be divine,
written by Moses with his hand guided by
God. But, as most of us know, the Torah is
mainly a long narrative story, so that its rules
and regulations tend to be concise and in
need of interpretation. Accordingly, halakah
(oral interpretation) is as old as the Torah
itself. Sometime during the first century
B.C.E., Torah "authorities" preached the doctrine that halakah was the "Oral" Torah, not
just interpretation. Henceforth the first five
books of the Old Testament were reduced to
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the "Written" Torah. The standard ploy of the
early "sages" was that the "Written" Torah
existed for the sake of the "Oral" Torah. In
other words, the "Oral" Torah actually
superceded the "Written" Bible in importance! Not surprisingly, almost immediately
some people denied the divine status of the
"Oral" Torah. Rabbi Akiva, the greatest
"sage" of the time, used a tactic later to
become common in the Christian hierarchy:
he frightened these heretics by declaring that
they would be excluded from the world-tocome. Akiva and other "authorities"
announced that only those who studied the
Torah full time were able to say whether the
"Oral" Torah was divine. (About one thousand or so years later, Pope Innocent III
forbade "laymen" from reading the Bible.)
Although the "sages" were confident that
the tens of thousands of words comprising
the "Oral" Torah had been faithfully passed
down through the centuries without error,
the practice of writing it down began during
the era in which Akiva flourished. This
written version of oral doctrine became
known as the Mishnah and there were probably many versions of it. It was finally completed in the canonized version we know
today by Judah-ha-Nasi somewhere around
200 C.E. Thereafter the Mishnah, not the
"Written" Torah became the central concern
of scholars.
For several centuries two principal centers
of study each produced a Talmud - detailed
commentaries on the Mishnah. In time the
Babylonian center achieved, for reasons that
needn't concern us, ascendancy over the
Jerusalem center. Today, when Jews refer to
"the" Talmud, it is that immense Babylonian
work completed about 600 C.E. and running
to two and a half million words that they
have in mind. The Talmud, unlike the
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Mishnah, is a scholarly work in which the
Talmudic "sages" proved their points about
Jewish law by citing passages in the Mishnah
and often, too, in the "Written" Bible.
Mishnah "sages" did not routinely quote biblical sources to prove a point. Indeed, what
could have been the point of doing so? After
all, the "Written" Torah was written for the
sake of the "Oral" Torah. Despite the more
humble approach of the Talmudists, in time
the Talmud itself came to be regarded with
the same reverence as the Mishnah. The 12th
century "sage" Rashi declared that the study
of the Talmud was more important than the
study of the Torah. Even before Rashi the
Talmud had become the chief object of study
in the "post-Talmud rabbinic period" and it
remains so to this day.
Although prior to the 19th century there
had been Jewish sects (for example, Chassidism), the first serious challenge to rabbinic
authority occurred in that century. In 1885
the leaders of the so-called "Reform" movement gathered in Pittsburgh and produced
what has become known as the "Pittsburgh
Platform." The following excerpt highlights a
few interesting aspects of "Reform":
We hold that all such Mosaic and rabbinicallaws as regulate diet ... originated
in ages and under the influence of ideas
entirely foreign to our present mental
and spiritual state ... We consider ourselves no longer a nation but a religious
community and therefore expect neither
a return to Palestine nor the restoration
of any of the laws concerning the Jewish
state. [My emphasis.]
This passage is bold and daring, but the
philosophy behind it need not have been
expressed so provocatively. The Pittsburgh
Platform could have emphasized the fact that
the Torah teaches us moral principles, instead
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of rigid rules.! Principles are not all-or-nothing
rules like a traffic law that forbids any vehicle
from travelling 30 miles per hour in a certain
zone. With such rules either you are violating
them or you are not. Instead, principles are
factors to be weighed in decision-making. The
Constitution, for example, is not a simple
book of recipes laying down a code of conduct
with precise instructions from which one
never deviates. A principle outlawing "unreascmable searches" always puts a premium on
intelligent deliberation: what is unreasonable
at one time or place may be reasonable at
another time or place.
The Pittsburgh Platform might have
emphasized the fact that the Bible lays down
principles of behavior that deserve to be
abided by throughout all ages but, since intelligence is also never outdated, must be applied
differentially in each epoch. It should have
made clearer than it did that the circumstances of moral deliberation inevitably
change and that much of what the Torah is
concerned with were conditions peculiar to its
time of composition. In fact, even the "Orthodox" make allowances for changing times.
Here is an example. Traditionally, Jews tore a
piece of their apparel at a funeral as a sign of
respect for the dead. Today, "Orthodox" Jews
pin a bit of ribbon to their clothes and then
snip it with scissors. What do they take themselves to be doing? They ought to say that the
symbolic meaning of the gesture remains
intact. Really to tear one's clothes today is a
sacrifice far and away greater than it was 2500
years ago. As we say today, "It's the gesture
that counts." Instead, "Orthodox" Jews take
themselves to be literally following a rule. In
my view, this makes a mockery of the custom
and does not respect it. It amounts to cheating. "Reform" Jews have pretty much abandoned the practice altogether and find other
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ways to obey the principle commanding that
the dead be shown respect.
In 1984 a group of distinguished representatives of the world's major religions gathered in
London for three days to discuss the use of
animals in science from each of their particular religion's point of view. Among the invitees was Rabbi David Bleich. His presentation
has now been published in the aforementioned
book edited by Tom Regan. The article does
not concern itself especially with animal
experimentation. It ranges over all aspects of
the treatment of animals, including the
slaughter of animals for food. Bleich discusses
each aspect with respect to tza'ar ha' alei
hayyim - the pain of living creatures. Bleich's
view is that Judaism is committed to reducing
the pain of living creatures wherever this is
feasible. The catch, obviously, is in determining when it is feasible. Bleich's method is to
provide a scholarly survey of what various
"sages" or "authorities" have had to say. He
never writes that So and So argues for this and
that but always says "In the opinion of this
great sage," etc. In the course of his thirty page
essay Bleich uses this expression, or some
variant of it, at least twenty-two times that I
noticed.
Bleich's summary view is that "In alllikelihood, the rationale governing the strictures
against tza'ar ha'alei hayyim is concern for the
moral welfare of the human agent rather than
concern for the physical welfare of the
animals... " He "argues" for the reasonableness
of this view by showing that it is shared by
"many early authorities." Bleich doesn't
mention it, but his view happens also to be the
standard Kantian view. Kant's view has been
subjected to extensive and rigorous criticism
and found to be logically wanting,2 The unargued for ground of Bleich's position is this:
doing x may be perfectly decent considered by
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itself, but it may cause depraved attitudes in
one who does it, and this depraved attitude
will cause him to do things that are wrong.
Now, of course this may sometimes be true, but
in general there is no reason to think that
practices unobjectionable in themselves will
slide slipperily down a slope and result in evil
character. Undoubtedly, none of the "sages"
did the empirical research necessary to establish that hurting animals leads, say, to hurting
children. Much more importantly, it is as plain
as anything can be that hurting animals is bad
in itself, and it is troubling to observe that
there are "sages" unable to grasp that fact.
Among the celebrated "authorities" Bleich
relies upon is Maimonides, who wrote that
"The reason for the prohibition against eating
a limb of a living animal is because this would
make one acquire the habit of cruelty." Maimonides appears to think either that a cruel
act is not bad unless it leads to the habit of
cruelty or else that a cruel habit isn't bad
unless it is practiced on humans. Why individual acts of cruelty are not bad unless habitual
is a doctrine far too subtle for me. If Maimonides means the second possibility, i.e., that
it is only cruelty habitually practiced on
humans that is bad, then I leave the reader to
decide if one can believe such a doctrine and
be a "sage."
Bleich contentedly quotes Maimonides
again when the latter writes, "Now since the
necessity to have good food requires that
animals be killed ..." For thousands of years
before Maimonides lived, and during his own
age as well, there were vegetarians, a great
many of whom lived as healthily as the omnivores and without any sense that they were
undergoing any noble deprivation. Maimonides knew this as well as anyone did. Why
then did he write the above? Well, why does
anyone write such things? I personally know
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intelligent professional philosophers who also
say that to have good food one must kill
animals. They know, as well as any reader of
this journal does, that there are life-long vegetarians who are now in their nineties. It is a
matter of not taking animals seriously enough
to bother with accuracy. People swear allegiance to the maxim "Thou shalt not kill" who
regularly slaughter animals. It is not a matter of
thinking that the maxim does not apply to
animals. It is a matter of not thinking.
Animals are simply not thought important
enough to pause over the question, "Does the
maxim apply to them?" I have no particular
axe to grind about the question. Suffice it to
say that not a single one of Bleich's "sages" or
"authorities" confronts the question, "Must we
eat animals to live well?," and consequently
none has a single illuminating or even stupid
thing to say about it. Bleich never pauses to
raise the question, "Would it be wrong for a
Jew to be a vegetarian?"
Bleich says that according to Jewish law
meat may be consumed only if the animal has
been slaughtered in conformity with a prescribed ritual. This is false. Most animals
"Orthodox" Jews eat are not slaughtered in
accordance with any ritual. Steve Sapontzis
has estimated that humans kill many trillions
of animals each year. All the farm animals
slaughtered and all the wild animals trapped
and hunted plus all the animals killed via
vivisection together are but a small fraction
of the number of animals people kill each
year. "Official" estimates don't approach this
estimate simply because the vast majority of
animals we kill (fish and invertebrates) don't
even deserve to be counted, much less
deserve to be worried about. Bleich's remark
reveals only his disdain for fish. He has no
reason to think they cannot suffer. He simply
doesn't think about them at all.
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icity testing, breaking the wings of birds so
that they cannot flyaway, and just about
anything else you can think of turns out to
be an exception to the proscription against
inflicting pain on animals. Everything is
proved by appeal to some rabbinic "authority" or other. Never once does Bleich grant
himself the license to ask, "Granted that
such and such practice is permitted, is it
required? Can we live reasonably happy lives
without sacrificing the animal? True, if we
kill the cow we must slit its throat in a
certain way, but would it be a terrible thing if
we ate a tomato instead?" Bleich's article is a
dutiful exposition of what greater men than
he have thought and said. He knows they are
greater, because they lived long ago. Not a
single one of his "authorities" lived in the
last two hundred years. I am reminded of the
aphorism that a statesman is a politician who
has been dead a long time.

Bleich holds that killing animals does not
necessarily involve a form of tza'ar 00'alei
hayyim and so isn't wrong per se. Do not
suppose that this is because killing needn't
be painful. Naturally, Bleich does not appeal
to the Torah for this but, rather, trots out a
long list of sayings by "sages" who agree with
him; for example, Ri Migash proclaims that
killing animals for human food is not tza'ar
00'alei hayyim but killing them for dog food
is. Bleich's final view is that pain may be
inflicted on animals without violating the
constraint on pain if the pain serves some
"legitimate human purpose." What makes his
view bizarre is his conception of what a legitimate purpose is. Quoting the Shulan Arukh
(a codification of laws first printed in 1565,
the following of which is regarded by the
faithful as the "true" test of "orthodoxy"),
Bleich says it is permissible to pluck the
feathers of fowl before slaughter. Shulan
Arukh concedes the practice is cruel but the
overriding legitimate purpose is having quills
for writing. Bleich invokes Talmudic
"authorities" to maintain that at the funeral
rites of a monarch it is permitted to sever the
tendons of the horse on which the king rode
as a way of bestowing honor on kings and
princes. Bleich is not in the habit of raising
an eyebrow and asking whether that is a
legitimate purpose. Bleich approvingly
quotes yet another "authority" who says a
chicken's toe may be cut off to render it unfit
for pagan sacrifice. He points out that the
"majority of rabbinic authorities" cite financial gain as a legitimate benefit that may be
pursued at the expense of tza'ar ba'alei
hayyim. Just about anything and everything
ends up being permitted. All biomedical
experiments, with anesthesia if appropriate
{and by implication, without anesthesia if
necessary} are fine with Bleich. Routine tox-
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food." Schwartz takes this to state a dietary

Schwartz's book is a refreshing contrast. His
basic claim, made in the first two chapters, is
that Jews ought to be vegetarians. The book
contains much else besides. There are chapters
on the health benefits of a vegetarian diet and
on the advantages of vegetarianism for feeding
the hungry of the world. Another chapter
develops a connection between the peace
movement and vegetarianism and there is one
giving interesting biographies of famous Jewish
vegetarians. Another chapter, donated by
Shoshana Margolin, presents vegetarian
recipes.
Schwartz understands that the world
changes, and among those changes has been
the introduction of intensive factory farming.
Our economy is no longer agrarian, and
because billions of people live today and the
numbers will keep growing, there can be no
retreat to the yesteryears of placid family
farming. Inevitably, however they may be
slaughtered, farm animals live miserable lives.
Anyone who partakes of a flesh diet is bound
to be violating the proscription against tza'aT

law. It seems to be no such thing. Nothing in
that passage implies or suggests that animals
may not be eaten. Schwartz also thinks the
passage, "And to every beast of the earth I
have given every green herb for food" is a
dietary law for animals. It is preposterous to
think animals who eat animals are sinners.
Later, according to Schwartz, God permitted
people to eat animals, since they were a bunch
of weak-willed wretches anyway. Later, again,
God actually provided meat, in the form of
quails, and when they ate the quails that put
him in a fury. Now none of this seems
attributable to a being worthy of being called
"God." If we take our cue as to what to eat
from God, let him act the part. Schwartz is
much better when he is arguing, as Bleich
never does, that it is a good thing not to eat
animals, permitted or not. These arguments are
developed mainly in the chapters on feeding
the hungry and on the healthfulness of a vegetarian diet.
Sometimes Schwartz makes the mistake of
appealing to the Talmud, "sages" and contemporary "authorities." He gets little mileage out
of any of this. He makes the nearly calamitous
mistake of citing a passage in the Talmud that
reads, "Only one who studies Torah may eat
meat, but one who does not study Torah is forbidden to eat meat." This is almost self-defeating. Schwartz wants to use the quotation to
claim that very few Jews today are scholarly
enough to justify their eating meat. But of
course he should limit himself to arguments
that say no one is entitled to eat meat, because
that is what he actually believes. He should not
appeal to "authorities" that have set themselves up as a class of privileged exceptions.
Schwartz says that Talmud "authorities" strongly disapprove of hunting, but of what significance is that? The essence of "Reform"

ba' a1ei hayyim.
Schwartz quotes biblical passages to prove
that compassion for animals is a direct moral
requirement and does not derive from any
worry that if we are cruel to them we will learn
to be cruel to ourselves. All this is praiseworthy. Unfortunately, Schwartz tries to prove too
much. He seems to think that vegetarianism is
not only permitted by the Bible and required
by contemporary realities; he thinks vegetarianism is strictly required by rigid rules of
Judaism. His arguments and quotations are
unconvincing. On the very first page of his
book he quotes the passage in Genesis that
reads, "Behold, I have given you every herb
yielding seed which is upon the face of the
earth, and every tree, in which is the fruit of a
tree yielding seed - to you it shall be for
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Judaism is its acceptance of progressive Tevela~
don according to which each Jew thinks for
her/himself and makes her/his own discoveries
as to what the Torah requires. Thus, the Tal~
mudic "authorities" either had reasons for disapproving of hunting, or they didn't. If they
had, it is the reasons that have authority, and
we should be told what those reasons are so we
may reflect on them. If they had no reasons,
then their views are arbitrary and carry no
weight. Near the end of his second chapter
Schwartz makes the curious remark that
Jewish slaughtering is the most humane form
of slaughtering. I am unclear why he makes
this "observation." Apart from the fact that
the remark is counterproductive tactically, it
has the minor vice of being patently false. The
slaughter might be made more humane in
many ways, e.g., administering an oral tran~
quilizer, followed by stunning, and only then

followed by the kosher slaughtering ritual.
Schwartz's book is not the scholarly tract
that Bleich's article is and, in any case, as I
said at the outset, cannot hope to influence
Jews in large numbers. But his book is read~
able, chock full of interesting stories and
recipes. "Reform" Jews will enjoy it; "Ortho~
dox" Jews won't go near it with a ten foot pole.

1 I owe the distinction between principles and
rules to the philosopher. lawyer, Ronald Dworkin.
2 Although the critiques of Kant (and hence
against Bleich) occur in very many places, the reader
need only consult the clear and cogent discussion in
Tom Regan's The Case far Animal Rights (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1983).
I am grateful to my friend and colleague, Scott
Hoogerhyde, for many illuminating discussions on
most of the points made in this paper.
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